This chapter explores what, if any, contributions a Hegelian ethics of recognition makes towards enriching our understanding of the intersubjective foundations of freedom. Against Berlin, I argue that recognition is wrongly construed as a form of solidarity with society that threatens individual freedom. Drawing from recent work by Honneth, I submit that distinct recognition regimes correspond to distinct social action spheres in a way that that facilitates critical reflection and freedom to resist over-reaching action spheres. I conclude that reconciling these action spheres on both individual and social levels by means of a meta-level form of social recognition in the way the Hegel postulated runs up against the Marx's critique of capitalism and Weber's and Durkheim's critique of modern liberal legal systems.
© 2021, Cambridge University Press
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/david_ingram/43/
Author Posting. © 2021, Cambridge University Press. This chapter is posted here by permission of Cambridge University Press for personal use, not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in "Recognition and Positive Freedom, Chapter Five of Positive Freedom: Past, Present, and Future. Ed. John Christman (Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp. 83-101. https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/political-philosophy/positive-freedom-past-present-and-future?format=HB&isbn=9781108487900